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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act states that a primary goal of health care reform should be to lower costs and promote
fiscal responsibility. With these two goals in mind, the bill proposes a more primary-care-oriented health
system by enacting a 5-year temporary Medicare fee increase for primary care physicians as a means to
increase the number of physicians and incentivize more primary care services. Using county and regional level
Medicare data, this paper finds that an increase in the number of primary care physicians per capita would
reduce per beneficiary Medicare spending and as a consequence, lower national health expenditures
substantially.
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 I. Introduction 
The evaluation of a national health care system focuses on three major 
criteria: cost, quality, and accessi. In all three categories, the United States 
performs abysmally when compared with other OECD countries. For example, 
per capita medical spending in the United States is approximately three times the 
OECD average; yet life expectancy is lower, the infant mortality rate higher, and 
the quality of care near last. The international consensus on the US health care 
system is that Americans spend more, to get less, for a select fewii. However, 
certain areas within the United States outperform OECD health care leaders like 
Denmark, while other American cities perform significantly worse than even the 
American average. In 2003 for example, the average Medicare beneficiary in 
Minneapolis cost the federal government $5,428 and on average received 
extremely high quality care, yet the average Medicare beneficiary in Miami 
received a lower quality of care for $11,500iii. 
 Several researchers have noted that if the US could merely reduce the 
highest spending areas to the American average, total Medicare spending could 
drop nearly 30%iv. Thus, current researchers are intent on understanding these 
small area variations (SAV) in health care spending and finding potential 
solutions. Early research shows that the number of ordered tests, in-patient 
services provided, and surgical operations performed account for a large portion 
of the regional variation and that primary care physicians often limit the 
overutilization of these expensive treatmentsv vi. Strong statistical evidence from 
the medical field supports these claims with recent findings that primary care 
directly reduces the number of hospital admissions, lowers readmission rates, 
improves patient health, and provides more effective care than specialist carevii. 
As a result, health care reformists and government officials have started to 
consider policy measures that incentivize a more primary-care-oriented system as 
part of a short and long term solution to the overutilization of care.  
Currently, these policies tend to focus on incentivizing the primary care 
physicians already present in the market to do more, and the specialists to think 
carefully before recommending expensive treatments. However, few researchers 
have focused on whether increasing the number of primary care physicians might 
cause a more primary-care-oriented health care system that reduces 
overutilization and leads to lower spending levels. Thus, I address the question of 
whether increasing the number of primary care physicians in the United States can 
lower national health care spending without lowering the quality of care. 
My analysis reveals that significant reductions in national health expenditures, 
as high as $2500viiiper Medicare beneficiary in some regions, can be achieved 
through increasing the number of primary care physicians from their current 
levels to the levels found in certain low-cost areas. These findings should spur 
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 further research and be considered in the current reforms of the U.S. health 
system. 
 A short literature review is presented in Section 2, which is followed by a 
presentation of the data and methods in section III. The aforementioned regression 
results are discussed in depth by section IV with a short policy conclusion in 
section V. 
 
II. Literature Review 
The literature on primary care, defined as “health care at a basic rather than 
specialized level for people making an initial approach to a doctor or nurse for 
treatment”ix, grew rapidly in the early 2000s. The influx emerged from three 
worrying trends: a perceived shortage of primary care physicians, a growing 
number of primary care physicians rejecting Medicare patients, and a continually 
shrinking pool of medical school graduates choosing primary carex.  
 Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko, all noted writers in the 
health care field, published a systematic review of the seminal works on the 
effects primary care has on different aspects of the health care system with 
“Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems and Health.”xi The in-depth 
review conducts a qualitative investigation of primary care’s role in the health 
care field. The authors present a convincing case that an increased number of 
primary care physicians and improved access would improve health for all 
Americans, but especially the most marginalized, through lowering mortality 
rates, improving self-assessed health, increasing life expectancy, and reducing 
acute hospital admissions. Almost the entire document focuses on how primary 
care affects health outcomes, not spending, yet these finding provide possible 
avenues for primary care to affect per capita spending and provide a foundation 
for my hypothesis.  
 Chandra and Baicker build from the compendium and earlier works by 
studying the effects of the physician workforce’s composition on Medicare 
spending and quality of care with an associational study using state-level data. 
“Medicare Spending, The Physician Workforce, and Beneficiaries’ quality of 
care” presents three main conclusions for state policy makers: higher Medicare 
spending is associated with lower quality care, the relationship could potentially 
be driven by intensive specialty care crowding out more effective basic care, and 
states with more primary care physicians as percentage of all physicians tend to 
have lower spending and a higher quality of care than the averagexii. The study 
provides a strong policy brief but performs only basic statistical analysis at the 
state level, which makes any definite conclusions hard to draw. Chandra and 
Baicker do have other more regression-based analysis on related materials, but 
focus more on the growth of medical spending.  
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  More mathematically rigorous studies have been conducted in areas 
related to the topic, and Fisher et al. in “The implications of Regional variation in 
Medicare Spending. Part 1:The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care” 
provide the strongest quantitative evidence showing that the overutilization of 
inpatient services plays a major role in driving excessive medical spending. They 
find inpatient admissions and hospital days, frequency of tests and specialist 
visits, and numbers of procedures account for large portions of the geographic 
variance in spendingxiii. Following his research, I attempt to meld his findings 
with earlier primary care research to see if primary care affects medical spending, 
potentially through the avenues highlighted in earlier literature. Like Fisher, I 
choose to take a more regression-based approach to test explicitly how primary 
care affects spending with the hypothesis that the supply of primary care 
physicians will significantly reduce the per capita level of Medicare spending. 
 
III. Study Data and Methods 
 
Data Sources and Type 
The dependent variable of Medicare spending per beneficiary comes from 
the Dartmouth Health Atlas’s (DHA) comprehensive data set, which includes a 
wide-variety of domestic health care data. The variable contains the Part A and 
Part B reimbursements for all beneficiaries and is broken down into 306 hospital 
referral regions (HRRs) that encompass the entire United States. I chose DHA 
data over raw data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
because prior literature favors the former, due to the adjustments for price, race, 
sex, & age built into the expenditures calculationsxiv. The price-adjustment is done 
by diagnosis related groupings (DRG) weighting and allows for researchers to test 
more accurately for other causes of regional variation, though price variations are 
of concern. For several supplementary regressions, I work from disaggregated 
portions of the total Medicare spending data that is broken into such components 
as Hospital Reimbursements, Ambulatory care sensitive Hospital 
Reimbursements, and Outpatient Reimbursements.  
 Additionally from Dartmouth Health Atlas, I take my primary variable of 
interest, the number of primary care physicians per 100,000 residents in each 
HRR. The label primary care physician applies broadly to general practitioners, 
family practice doctors, and in my case geriatricians to compensate for my use of 
Medicare data. Other hospital control variables come from the DHA data set as 
well, such as the number of acute care hospital beds and end-of-life hospital 
spending. Furthermore, the hospital quality index, also used in a supplementary 
regression, includes a comprehensive assessment of the quality of care of each 
hospital in the country calculated through an amalgamation of readmission rates, 
effective procedures, consumer satisfaction, and several other indicators. Previous 
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 literature suggests that more primary care physicians in an area leads to higher 
levels of quality in hospital care as well as lower recovery times for proceduresxv 
xvi
, which my results generally support. The DHA provides average scores for 
each HRR, which is what I include.  
 Several other databases provide important information for my control 
variables such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), the Census 
Bureau (SAIPE), the Center for Medicare Services, and Area Resource File 
(ARF). These databases provided county level data for income, health, education, 
and demographic characteristics. From prior literature, I followed precedent in 
assigning these variables to all 306 Hospital Referral Regions. Dartmouth Health 
Atlas provides a lengthy and detailed explanation of how to assign counties and 
zip codes to each HRR, which is provided in a convenient data set for merging. 
The data was compiled in excel and then merged into a single data set for 
regression analysis in STATA 13C. 
 A summary of the data is presented in Table 1 and shows the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the major control and interest 
variables discussed in the results. In 2006, the average Medicare beneficiary 
required almost $8,000 in care, but the standard deviation and divergent minimum 
and maximum values show the regional variation present with an almost $8,500 
difference between the lowest spending and highest spending region. The 
disparities in poverty as well as spending in the last six months of life should be 
noted, although the two are not correlated in any way. Worth noting as well from 
a basic summary of the statistics is the wide variance in the number of primary 
care physicians and medical specialists by HRR. The maximum number of 
primary care physicians is nearly three times the minimum value and the same 
wide disparity exists with the number of medical specialists. 
 
Analysis and Methods: 
To disentangle the relationship between the number of primary care 
physicians and the level of total Medicare spending at the HRR level, I use least-
squares linear regression, following precedent. The primary variables of interest 
are the level of Medicare spending per beneficiary and the number of primary 
care physicians per resident, which are then supplemented by a number of 
controls.  
In an attempt to control for health status across HRR, I use percent of 
individuals who smoke regularly, the self-reported health average, and the adult 
obesity rate. Few previous regressions have controlled for health based upon the 
inability to have data on the specific Medicare beneficiaries, yet I choose to do so 
because of the strong correlation between many county level demographic and 
income statistics for the elderly and young. 
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 To control for socioeconomic issues, I used poverty rates and percent of 
persons with only a high school degree. Poverty rate captures such statistics as 
employment status, income, and other household characteristics and explains 
more variation in Medicare spending than other combinations of wealth 
variablesxvii. Educational level is commonly controlled for through the portion of 
a population with only a high school degree.  
 For medical controls, I controlled for a culture of high intensity care, 
commonly cited in literature, with the total amount of spending in the last six 
months of life, which also has precedent in earlier literature and makes logical 
sense. Physicians willing to undertake expensive procedures that cost substantial 
sums of money to save an individual in the last six months should also be willing 
to spend higher sums of money in general on the care of individuals in a region. I 
used number of hospital beds to control for supply driven care that might come 
from the attitude “We have the beds so let’s fill them.” To test for physician-
induced demand, I control for the number of specialists in a region because of 
recent literature that suggests specialists induce more procedures than necessary 
for the increased monetary benefits of performing more proceduresxviii. 
Before moving to the results, I wish to note several possible econometric 
issues with testing my intended hypothesis. First of all, there is a considerable 
issue with finding the direction of causality and the potential for simultaneity bias 
in my equation. Primary care physicians may work in areas where there are high 
levels of Medicare spending in an attempt to increase incomes. This would hurt 
my ability to find a significant effect. On the other hand, Medicare offers very low 
reimbursement rates and may cause primary care physicians to leave areas with 
high levels of Medicare spending, which might actually strengthen some of my 
results. Furthermore, many of the control variables contain some degree of 
correlation and make discerning causality all that much harder. 
Additionally, heteroscedasticity could be an issue as variance might vary 
with larger populations, different attitudes toward health, and demographic 
characteristics for spending as well as many of the control variables. For this 
reason, I used heteroscedasticity-controlled standard errors to remove bias from 
my hypotheses tests. Lastly, my model may suffer from omitted variable bias 
because there are many variables that are nearly impossible to control for in the 
health care market as far personal relationships between hospitals and insurers, 
market power, state regulations etc. Furthermore, the health care market is so 
interconnected that causality is almost impossible to establish, yet regressions still 
provide helpful information that should be used to formulate policy. 
 
IV. Results & Discussion 
Before discussing regression results, see Graph 1 for a basic correlation graph 
of the number of primary care physicians per resident and total Medicare 
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 spending per beneficiary for each HRR. Though no specific avenue of impact can 
be identified through a basic correlation, the -.4 correlation value between the two 
variables shows a strong association but falls short of showing any stronger 
evidence. The negative association results between the two variables is not 
surprising but nevertheless, provides a strong point of departure for more 
analytical regression results.  
The regression results reinforce the earlier correlation graph and shows that an 
increase in one primary care physician per 100,000 residents, while holding all 
other regressed variables constant, will reduce total Medicare spending for Part A 
and Part B by $44 on average for a HRR region (see table 2). The finding is 
consistent with earlier research that shows primary care reduces overutilization of 
expensive services, which then would reduce Medicare spending levels, but my 
regression results provide strong evidence that the supply of primary care 
physicians is worth considering for policy measures. The results are not only 
statistically significant with a t-score of 9.09 but also are economically significant 
as can be shown by the following analysis. If the average HRR increased the 
number of primary care physicians by a single standard deviation, Medicare 
spending per beneficiary would drop by about $528. The amount may not seem 
substantial but that there were are 49.5 million Medicare beneficiaries in the 
United States in 2013 and the number has risen substantially since. The result 
would be a reduction in Medicare Spending nationally of over $26.1 billion 
dollars for 2013, which does not take into account the benefits provided to the rest 
of the population.  
Several other coefficients, beside the variable of interest, are worth noting in 
conjunction with other theories about the causes for small area variation in 
medical spending. The total specialists variable is not positively significant, which 
may suggest physician-induced demand, at least among specialists, is not as 
prominent as many have feared. The evidence is not conclusive by any means, 
since we are only looking at the broad measure of all specialists in a region, but 
the result is worth note. However, the number of hospital beds in a region is 
statistically significant and carries a large economic significance too. The 486.97 
regression coefficient suggests that each additional hospital bed per 1000 
residents adds almost $487 dollars per Medicare beneficiary in average spending. 
The result provides support for the idea that hospitals will keep the beds in the 
hospital full to maximize revenue. Although not an unexpected result, it provides 
evidence that supply driven spending takes place in health care markets.  
The signs and significances of the other control variables match with theory 
and do not provide any surprising results. The only other variable worth 
mentioning is the significance of the logged Medicare enrollees per region. The 
result suggests that having more Medicare enrollees in an HRR leads to a higher 
level of spending per beneficiary. The finding might suggest that regions with 
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 large Medicare populations cater more to the needs of the elderly and might even 
target the elderly, likely Medicare beneficiaries, for more intensive care knowing 
Medicare covers the fees. While the evidence for such a theory is vague at best, 
the result deserves further research.  
In exploring how primary care physicians reduce spending, we can see from 
table 3, which holds regression results for discharges for ambulatory care 
sensitive cases in hospitals as the dependent variable and the number of primary 
care physicians per beneficiary as the variable of interest, that one way is through 
unnecessary visits to the hospital. Ambulatory care sensitive discharges measures 
the number of patients a hospital admits for issues like asthma, diabetes, or minor 
injuries that could be taken care of by a primary care physician. The regression 
shows that increasing the supply of primary care physicians by 1 physician per 
100, 000 residents while holding all other regressed variables constant, reduces 
the number of ambulatory care sensitive discharges by almost a quarter of a visit 
per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries and is statistically significant. While that may 
not seem substantial, the average hospital admission now costs $2,168xix, so the 
quarter of a visit reduction in the number of discharges associated with adding 
one primary care physician per 100,000 residents results in about $542 per 
hospital discharge for an Ambulatory Care Sensitive condition among Medicare 
beneficiaries.  
A common argument against reducing spending states that quality will 
diminish with less spending, although there is substantial evidence that more 
spending often leads to lower quality carexx. My regression data actually suggests 
that hospital quality will improve with an increase in primary care physicians, 
though not in a meaningful way. In table 4, the number of primary care physicians 
holds economic significance with the dependent variable of hospital quality, 
though the increase in quality is marginal at best. For this reason, primary care 
should not be used as a policy mechanism to increase the quality of care in 
hospitals, as it is fairly inefficient, but the results provide support for the argument 
that Medicare spending can be reduced without harming the already low quality 
of care in the United States.  
 
V. Policy Recommendations and Conclusions 
The regression results support policy reform that increases the supply of 
primary care physicians in the United States as a means to reduce the high levels 
of Medicare expenditure per beneficiary as well as overall health care spending. 
While my results do not explicitly show how primary care reduces spending, there 
is a substantial literature that suggests one major avenue is through the reducing 
the overutilization of tests, procedures, in-patient services, and superfluous care. 
These effects would take place quickly and would be further built upon by a long-
term improvement in health for Americans, which might hold a more long-term 
7
Bricker: The Benefits of a Primary-Care-Oriented Health System
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
 solution to exorbitant medical cost levels. Even with such substantial benefits, 
engineering policies to increase the supply of primary care physicians is not easy 
or without political traps.  
There are many methods to increase the supply of primary care physicians, 
essentially ways to incentivize and subsidize primary care physicians, yet as many 
economists would note using a basic supply and demand model that an increase in 
the supply would only further depress wages for primary care physicians. These 
reduced wages would only widen the incredible wage gap between primary care 
physicians and specialist doctors, which plays a large role, in my opinion, in the 
original shortage. I argue that is not the case with right set of policies and 
incentives.  
The wages of primary care physicians are hardly tied to the market price of 
their services due to third party payers in the form of large insurance companies 
and the federal government. Therefore, it is possible to raise the incomes of 
primary care physicians even if the market price for their services drops with the 
increase in supply. This seemingly paradoxical result could be achieved by setting 
much higher reimbursement minimums for insurance companies, Medicare, and 
Medicaid through the federal government. In fact, primary care physicians only 
receive about between 5% to 30% of the market price currently for their services 
under Medicare, and even less for Medicaid and some large insurers because of a 
lack of market powerxxi. If that number were to be increased to 50% across the 
board, incomes as well as lifetime earnings for primary care physicians would 
increase dramatically even with a slightly lower market price. Therefore, I agree 
with the ACA initiative to increase Medicare reimbursement fees, although I 
would argue for a larger permanent increase across all payment parties rather than 
the small temporary Medicare increase in the bill. 
In addition to raising the reimbursement rates for primary care physicians, I 
would provide debt alleviation for medical school students who choose primary 
care to achieve quicker changes in the supply of primary care physiciansxxii. With 
less debt and higher incomes, primary care physicians would receive more 
adequate compensation for the value contributed to the health care market. As 
critics will note, the measures to increase the supply of primary care physicians 
will cost money, but with the large savings from reduced medical spending and an 
overall healthier population, I believe the cost for such measures will pale in 
comparison to the savings.  
A more controversial, but possibly more effective, policy would be to allow 
the immigration of highly qualified primary care physicians to the United states 
along with the increased compensation methods shown earlier in order to keep 
incomes from dropping substantially. The increase in supply would be immediate, 
rather than take place over 4 years, and might achieve similar results, although 
more research into the topic should be done. Additionally, further research should 
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 formally look to do a cost benefit analysis of subsidizing an increase in primary 
care physicians as a possible solution to high levels of medical spending. 
 
ENDNOTES 
                                                        
i Sparling, Alica. 2014. “Health Care Economics: An Introduction.” Presentation for Health 
Economics 322. January 19. 
 
ii “OECD iLibrary > Health at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators.” 2013. 
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf 
  
iii Chernew, Michael E., Lindsay Sabik, Amitabh Chandra, and Joseph Newhouse. 2009. “Would 
Have More Primary Care Doctors Cut Health Spending Growth?” Health Affairs 28(5): 1327-
1335. 
 
iv Gawande, Atul. 2009. “The Cost Conundrum.” The New Yorker, June 1. 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all 
 
v Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra. 2004. “Medicare Spending, The Physician Workforce, 
And Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care.” Health Affairs April 7.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.citation 
 
vi Fisher, Elliott S., David Wennberg, Therese Stukel, Daniel Gottlieb, F.L. Lucas, and Etoile 
Pinder. 2003. “The Impliations of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, 
Quality, and Accessibility of Care.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 138:273-287. 
 
vii Starfield, Barbara, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko. 2005.“Contribution of Primary Care to 
Health Systems and Health.” Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3: 457-502 
 
viii Calculated by taking the coefficient from regressions for primary care physicians and 
multiplying the coefficient by the number of primary care physicians need to rank the HRR 
as the 90th percentile. Data will be given upon request.  
 
ix Definition. "Primary Care Physician." The Oxford American College Dictionary, through 
Google.com. 2014. 
 
x Hogberg, David. 2012. “The Next Exodus: Primary-Care Physicians and Medicare.” The 
National Center for Public Policy Research: National Policy Analysis, August. 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA640.html 
 
xi Starfield, Barbara, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko. 2005.“Contribution of Primary Care to 
Health Systems and Health.” Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3: 457-502 
 
xii Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra. 2004. “Medicare Spending, The Physician 
Workforce, And Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care.” Health Affairs April 7.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.citation 
 
9
Bricker: The Benefits of a Primary-Care-Oriented Health System
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
                                                                                                                                                        
xiii Fisher, Elliott S., David Wennberg, Therese Stukel, Daniel Gottlieb, F.L. Lucas, and Etoile 
Pinder. 2003. “The Impliations of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, 
Quality, and Accessibility of Care.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 138:273-287. 
 
xiv Dartmouth Health Atlas. 2011. “A New Series of Medicare Expenditure Measures by Hospital 
Referral Region: 2003-2008.” A Report of the Dartmouth Atlas Project, June 21. 
 
 
xv Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra. 2004. “Medicare Spending, The Physician 
Workforce, And Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care.” Health Affairs April 7.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.citation 
 
xvi Starfield, Barbara, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko. 2005.“Contribution of Primary Care to 
Health Systems and Health.” Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3: 457-502. 
 
xvii Personal observation from working with my data 
 
xviii Gawande, Atul. 2009. “The Cost Conundrum.” The New Yorker, June 1. 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all 
 
xix Abrams, Lindsay. 2013. “How Much Does It Cost to Go to the ER?” The Atlantic, February 
28. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/02/how-much-does-it-cost-to-go-to-
the-er/273599/ 
 
xx Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra. 2004. “Medicare Spending, The Physician 
Workforce, And Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care.” Health Affairs April 7.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.citation 
 
xxi CEO of OrthoCarolina. Interviewed by author. Small group discussion. Dr. Alica Sparling’s 
home. March 2014. 
 
xxii Reinhardt, Uwe E. 2011. “Producing More Primary-Care Doctors.” New York Times: 
Economix Blog, June 10. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/producing-more-
primary-care-doctors/ 
 
WORKS CITED 
 
1. Alexander, Jeffrey A, Shoou-Yih D. Lee, John Griffith, Stephen S. Mick, Xihong Lin, 
and Jane Banaszak-Holl. 1999. “Do Market-Level Hospital and Physician Resources 
Affect Small Area Variation in Hospital Use?” Medical Care Research and Review, 56-
94. 
 
2. Abrams, Melinda. 2011. “How Will the Affordable Care Act Bolster Primary Care?” The 
Common Wealth Fund, January 4. 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Blog/2011/Jan/Affordable-Care-Act-Bolsters-
Primary-Care.aspx 
 
10
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/6
                                                                                                                                                        
3. Baicker, Katherine and Amitabh Chandra. 2004. “Medicare Spending, The Physician 
Workforce, And Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care.” Health Affairs April 7.  
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.citation 
 
4. Chernew, Michael E., Lindsay Sabik, Amitabh Chandra, and Joseph Newhouse. 2009. 
“Would Have More Primary Care Doctors Cut Health Spending Growth?” Health Affairs 
28(5): 1327-1335. 
 
5. Dartmouth Health Atlas. 2009. “Health Care Spending, Quality, and Outcomes: More 
isn’t Always Better.” Dartmouth Atlas Project Topic Brief, February 27.  
 
6. Dartmouth Health Atlas. 2011. “A New Series of Medicare Expenditure Measures by 
Hospital Referral Region: 2003-2008.” A Report of the Dartmouth Atlas Project, June 21. 
 
7. Dartmouth Health Atlas. 2014. “Medicare Reimbursements.” Key Issues: Medicare 
Spending. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=1339 
 
8. Fisher, Elliott S., David Wennberg, Therese Stukel, Daniel Gottlieb, F.L. Lucas, and 
Etoile Pinder. 2003. “The Impliations of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 
1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 
138:273-287. 
 
9. Fisher, Elliot, David Wennberg, Therese Stukel, Daniel Gottlieb, F.L. Lucas, and Etoile 
Pinder. 2003. “The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: 
Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care.” Annals of Internal Medicine, 138:288-298.  
 
10. Gawande, Atul. 2009. “The Cost Conundrum.” The New Yorker, June 1. 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=
all 
 
11. Gorman, Christine. 2010. “How Primary Care Heals Health Disparities.” Scientific 
American, September 1. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/closing-the-health-
gap 
 
12. Hogberg, David. 2012. “The Next Exodus: Primary-Care Physicians and Medicare.” The 
National Center for Public Policy Research: National Policy Analysis, August. 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA640.html 
 
13. Kliff, Sarah. “Obamacare is about to give Medicaid doctor’s a 73 percent raise.” 
Washington Post: Workblog, December 21. (Comments). 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/21/obamacare-is-about-to-
give-medicaid-docs-a-73-percent-raise/ 
 
14. Marbury, Donna. 2013. “Productivity in primary care is geared for a revival.” Medical 
Economics, November 25th. http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/medical-
economics/news/productivity-primary-care-geared-revival 
 
11
Bricker: The Benefits of a Primary-Care-Oriented Health System
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
                                                                                                                                                        
15. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. 2012. “Use and Expenses for Office-Based Physician 
Visits by Specialty, 2009:Estimates for the U.S. Civilian Noninstitutionalized 
Population.” Statistical Brief 391. 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st381/stat381.pdf 
 
16. Parchman, Michael and Steven Culler. 1999. “Preventable Hospitalizations in Primary 
Care Shortage Areas.” Archer Family Medicine, 8:487-491. 
 
17. OECD iLibrary: Statistics > Health at a Glance > 2011 > Consultations with Doctors.” 
2011. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/health_glance-2011-
en/04/01/index.html;jsessionid=cglsg3b4phjf.x-oecd-live-
01?contentType=&itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fchapter%2Fhealth_glance-2011-29-
en&mimeType=text%2Fhtml&containerItemId=%2Fcontent%2Fserial%2F19991312&a
ccessItemIds=%2Fcontent%2Fbook%2Fhealth_glance-2011-en 
 
18. Schiliro, Philip. 2014. “The Affordable Care Act is Working.” Politico, March 19. 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/affordable-care-act-is-working-
104942.html#.U0m35HB_jao 
 
19. Stafford, Randall, Demet Saglam, Nancyanne Causino, Barbara Starfield, Larry 
Culpepper, William D. Marder, and David Blumenthal. 1999. “Trends in Adult Visits to 
Primary Care Physicians in the United States.” Archer Family Medicine, 8:26-32. 
 
20. Starfield, Babara and George Fryer. 2007. “The Primary Care Physician Workforce: 
Ethical and Policy Implication.” Annals of Family Medicine, vol. 5 (6): 486-491. 
 
21. Starfield, Barbara, Leiyu Shi, and James Macinko. 2005.“Contribution of Primary Care to 
Health Systems and Health.” Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 83, No. 3: 457-502. 
 
22. Sifferlin, Alexandra. 2012. “Doctors’ Salaries: Who Earns the Most and the Least?” Time 
Magazine, April 27. http://healthland.time.com/2012/04/27/doctors-salaries-who-earns-
the-most-and-the-least/ 
 
23. Reinhardt, Uwe E. 2011. “Producing More Primary-Care Doctors.” New York Times: 
Economix Blog, June 10. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/producing-
more-primary-care-doctors/ 
 
24. Reschovsky, James D., Arkadipta Ghosh, Kate Stewart, and Deborah Chollet. 2012. 
“Paying More for Primary Care: Can It Help Bend the Medicare Cost Curve?” 
Commonwealth Fund pub. 1585, Vol. 5. 
 
25. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2014. “Shortage Designation: Health 
Professional Shortage Areas & Medically Underserved Areas/Population.” January 1. 
http://www.hrsa.gov/shortage/ 
 
 
 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/6
                                                                                                                                                        
Data Appendix 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Table 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Medicare Reimbursement 
with Price, Age, Sex, and Race Adj. $7,944 $1,155 $5,634 $14,011 
Hospital Specific Medicare 
Reimbursement with Price, Age, 
Sex, and Race Adj. $3,967 $618 $2,506 $5,837 
Outpatient Specific Medicare 
Reimbursement with Price, Age, 
Sex, and Race Adj. $857 $190 $457 $1,645 
Total Number of Medicare 
Enrollees 92,959 84,717 15,502 508,813 
Ambulatory Care Sensitive 
Hospital Discharges 74.9 18.0 29.7 135.2 
Number of Acute Care Hospital 
Beds per 1,000 Residents 2.5 0.6 1.4 4.7 
Primary Care Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 70.5 12.0 43.9 117.0 
Total Specialists per 100,000 
Residents 120.1 20.8 68.3 215.0 
People Living in Poverty (Percent) 14% 5% 4% 37% 
People with only a high school 
degree (Percent) 29% 6% 9% 49% 
Residents Self-Reporting Fair to 
Poor Health (Percent) 15% 4% 0% 33% 
Obese Adult Residents (Percent) 26% 4% 13% 35% 
Regular Smoking Residents 
(Percent) 20% 5% 0% 40% 
Average Spending in the Last 6 
months of life $13,027  $3,454  $7,788  $32,633  
Average Age of Beneficiary 71.6 1.4 67.0 75.0 
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Table 3
Number of obs = 306
F( 12,   293) = 48.17
Prob > F  =  0.000
R-squared = 0.70
Dependent Variable Root MSE = 10.00
Hospital Discharges For 
Ambulatory Sensitive 
Care
Independent Variables Coef. Std. Err. T-Score P>t
Primary Care Physicians 
per 100,000 Residents -0.240 0.076 -3.17    0.002
Total Specialists per 
100,000 Residents 0.008 0.044 0.18   0.856 
Number of Acute Care 
Hospital Beds per 1,000 16.573 1.149 14.43    0.000
CMS Hospital Quality 
Score 1.502 27.075 0.06   0.956 
Last 6 months  Medicare 
Spending per decedent 0.002 0.000 7.07   0.000 
People with only a high 
school degree (Percent) 0.307 0.116 2.65   0.008 
People Living in Poverty 
(Percent) -0.021 0.152 -0.14    0.892
Ln(Total Number of 
Medicare Enrollees) 1.748 0.883 1.98   0.049 
Average Age of 
Beneficiary -3.211 0.515 -6.24    0.000
Regular Smoking 
Residents (Percent) 0.410 0.154 2.67   0.008 
Residents Self-
Reporting Fair to Poor -0.350 0.168 -2.09    0.038
Obese Adult Residents 
(Percent) 0.480 0.241 1.99   0.048 
Constant 212.397 42.002 5.06   0.000 
Hospital Discharges for Ambulatory Sensative Care
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Table 4         
Hospital Quality of Care 
      Number of obs =  306 
      F( 11,   294) = 4.65 
      Prob > F   =  0.000 
      R-squared =  0.17 
Dependent Variable     Root MSE= .025 
CMS Hospital Quality Score 
        
Independent Variable Coef. 
Std. 
Err. T-Score P>t 
Primary Care Physicians per 
100,000 Residents 0.05394 0.0161 3.35    0.001  
Total Specialists per 100,000 
Residents -0.00726 0.0128 -0.57    0.572 
Number of Acute Care Hospital 
Beds per 1,000 Residents -0.08432 0.3465 -0.24    0.808 
Last 6 months Medicare 
Spending per decedent 0 0 -0.31    0.755 
People with only a high school 
degree (Percent) -0.00114 0.0310 -0.04    0.971 
People Living in Poverty 
(Percent) -0.09281 0.0450 -2.06    0.040 
Ln (Total Number of Medicare 
Enrollees) 0.07817 0.2079 0.38    0.707  
Average Age of Beneficiary 0.32364 0.1279 2.53    0.012  
Regular Smoking Residents 
(Percent) 0.13565 0.0448 3.02    0.003  
Residents Self-Reporting Fair 
to Poor Health (Percent) -0.04386 0.0447 -0.98    0.328 
Obese Adult Residents 
(Percent) 0.0257 0.0579 0.44    0.658  
Constant 0.62382 0.0951 6.55    0.000  
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Table 5
Number of obs = 306
F( 10,   295) = 14.28
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.32
Root MSE = 158.49
Dependent Variable
Outpatient Spending 
per Medicare 
Beneficiary
Independent Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
Primary Care Physicians 
per 100,000 Residents 7.29 1.11 6.55 0.000
Total Specialists per 
100,000 Residents -2.78 0.73 -3.82 0.000
Number of Acute Care 
Hospital Beds per 1,000 112.86 17.39 6.49 0.000
CMS Hospital Quality 
Score 929.04 359.68 2.58 0.010
Last 6 months  Medicare 
Spending per decedent -0.01 0.00 -3.18 0.002
People with only a high 
school degree (Percent) 2.25 1.70 1.32 0.187
People Living in Poverty 
(Percent) -0.15 2.35 -0.06 0.949
Ln(Total Number of 
Medicare Enrollees) -7.45 12.97 -0.57 0.566
Average Age of 
Beneficiary 17.60 7.59 2.32 0.021
Regular Smoking 
Residents (Percent) -0.36 2.21 -0.16 0.871
Constant -1,542.38 610.26 -2.53 0.012
Outpatient Spending
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